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THE SALE OF CREDIT LIFE INSURANCE: THE
BANK AS FIDUCIARY
MARK BUDNITZf
Banks and savings and loans recently began expanding signfi-
candy the services available to their customers. This development could
alter drastically the legal relationship between the two parties. Professor
Budnitz focuses on a well-established and prevalent service, the sale of
credit life insurance, as a prototype for exploring the potential rights
and obligations of the bank and its customer when involved in transac-
tions other than the traditional loan agreement. Banks sell credit 1ife
insurance as part of nearly every consumer loan not involving real es-
tate. When a customer requests that the bankprocure credit 1fe insur-
ance but the bank fails to do so, courts determine whether to impose
fiduciary obligations on the bank by applying one of three theories of
fiduciary law. Professor Budnitz critically analyzes these theories and
concludes that the bank should be considered the agent of the customer
and that the transaction should be governed by traditional agency law.
Substantial disagreement and confusion exist among judicial decisions
over who bears the risk of loss in transactions between banks and their cus-
tomers. One cause of this inconsistency among the courts is the failure of most
courts to consider seriously the legal relationship between the two parties. At
the other extreme, some courts define the legal relationship, but do so by
squeezing the transaction into a doctrinal mold that does not fit. As banks
offer new financial services' and institutions that are not banks offer banking
services, 2 the need to establish clearly the legal relationship between customers
and these various institutions becomes crucial.
The case law is in disarray in part because the legal relationship between
the parties varies depending upon the type of transaction and the particular
stage of the transaction at which a dispute occurs. This Article focuses on one
stage of the consumer loan transaction, the sale of credit life insurance. This is
an important area because this type of insurance is sold as part of nearly every
consumer loan other than those involving real estate,3 and every year billions
t Associate Professor, Emory University School of Law. A.B. 1966, Dartmouth; J.D. 1969,
Harvard.
1. See generally 7hrfts Look to Insurance to Boost Profits, Am. Banker, Feb. 28, 1983, at 1,
col. 1; Arvan, Merrill Forges Creative Partnerslp With Banks, Am. Banker, Feb. 22, 1983, at 1,
col. 2; McMurray, Chase Manhattan Set to Buy Fourth Biggest Discount Firm, Am. Banker, Feb.
14, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
2. See generally Sears Will Sell Financial Services Worldwide, Am. Banker, March 2, 1983,
at I, col. 2; New Hampshire Lets Fidelity Establish Bank, Am. Banker, Feb. 10, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
3. R. SABLE & W. OGBURN, LIMITATION AND REGULATION OF CREDIT PROPERTY INSUR-
ANCE 19 (1978); Shefifey, Credit Life and Disability Insurance Disclosures Under Truth-in-Lending:
The Triumph of Form Over Substance, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 463 n.2 (1980).
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of dollars4 worth of credit life is sold to millions of consumers. In addition,
examining decisions involving credit life insurance provides valuable insights
in developing an approach to legal relationships between banks and customers
in other types of banking transactions.
Focusing on the legal relationship between the parties provides a helpful
neutral ground for wrestling with the emotion-laden problems courts confront
when dealing with consumer-creditor disputes. Consumer representatives
point to cases involving sick, illiterate, helpless debtors who were victimized
by rapacious, overreaching, deceitful creditors.5 They often urge enactment of
statutes and regulations to protect consumers. Creditors claim they are being
strangled by excessive regulation even though most creditors engage in reason-
able practices. In addition, creditors claim that competition in the market-
place ensures that consumers will not be exploited.6 Needed is an approach
that will enable courts to assess the social and economic realities of the trans-
action, consider the needs of each side, and decide on the rights and liabilities
of each within the framework of a neutral legal doctrine. In reviewing the
current state of the law on the sale of credit life insurance, this Article will
show how identifying the appropriate legal relationship between the parties
can provide this framework and satisfy consumer needs without further
regulation.
This study focuses primarily on cases that have addressed the legal rela-
tionship between the parties to determine if the bank is in the position of a
fiduciary when it sells credit life insurance. To provide necessary background,
this Article describes the credit life insurance industry and summarizes the
general fiduciary law. Cases in which fiduciary duties have been imposed on
banks are then examined. These cases have been decided in apparent isola-
tion, with each court seemingly unaware of the approaches most other courts
have adopted. As a result, no consistent analytical framework has emerged.
The decisions are best understood and evaluated by examining them within
the general framework of fiduciary law. From this perspective, the cases fall
into three categories to which fiduciary obligations may apply: (1) contract to
procure insurance and entrusting of premiums, (2) trust and confidence, and
(3) agency.
In the first category of cases, after the bank fails to obtain insurance, con-
sumers often contend that a contractual relationship, imposing an obligation
on the bank to procure insurance, arose when the consumer signed a Truth in
Lending disclosure statement. In addition to the contractual obligations,
fiduciary obligations may arise if the consumer has paid the premium. The
4. In 1980, 78,446,000 credit life insurance policies were in force in the amount of
$165,215,000,000. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 34
(1981).
5. See, e.g, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Im-
perial Discount Corp. v. Aiken, 38 Misc. 2d 187, 238 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1963); Arthur Murray Studio,
Inc. v. FTC, 78 F.T.C. 401, 439-41 (1971), af'd, 458 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972).
6. See generally NAT'L COMM. ON CONSUMER FIN. REP., CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2-3 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NCCF REPORT]; Muris, Rules Without Reason:
The Case ofthe FTC, REO., Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 20.
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courts are divided on this issue, and a contractual analysis alone cannot re-
solve all of the questions that these transactions present.
In the second group of cases, other courts impose on the bank the duties
of a fiduciary as a result of the trust and confidence that the consumer has
reposed in the bank. This approach provides a far more encompassing frame-
work for analyzing credit life insurance issues, but rests on unproven assump-
tions, does violence to fiduciary principles, and is unfair to banks.
The third line of cases examines the features of the transaction to deter-
mine if the bank has acted as the borrower's agent during the sale of the insur-
ance. If it has, certain fiduciary duties follow. This approach provides the
most appropriate framework for analyzing the relationship between the parties
in the sale of credit life insurance. It treats these transactions primarily as
insurance transactions, and subjects banks to the same rules as those gov-
erning other agents procuring insurance. It imposes fiduciary duties upon
banks, but only if they conduct themselves in ways that create the agency rela-
tionship. Far from creating a radical new theory which saddles banks with
new responsibilities, this approach imposes fiduciary duties within the well-
established traditional framework of agency law.
I. THE CREDIT LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
Credit life insurance is designed to protect the lender. In the event the
borrower dies, the insurance company will pay the outstanding obligation and
discharge the obligation. Ordinarily credit life is sold as group insurance in
transactions that do not involve real estate.7 The policy is issued to the lender,
not the borrower, and the insured group is designated as those consumers who
borrow money from the lender. The lender, as policyholder, pays the pre-
mium, but most lenders pass the cost on to the consumer.8
In most instances the purchase is an unwise investment for the consumer.
The cost of the insurance is high; the profit for the banks is great.9 The banks
earn substantial income from the sale of this insurance. 10 The cost of the in-
surance is high because of "reverse competition."I Reverse competition re-
7. NCCF REPORT, .supra note 6, at 83. Extensions of credit that do not involve real estate
are too small in amount and too short in duration for insurers to make reasonable profits by
selling individual policies.
8. NCCF REPORT, supra note 6, at 84. Many credit unions do not impose an explicit charge
on consumers for credit life insurance. Id
9. Credit Life Insurance: Hearing Before the Subcomtm on Antitrust, Monopoly and Business
Rights of the Senate Comn. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 8 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Hearing]; NCCF REPORT, supra note 6, at 89. The income derived from the sale of credit
life insurance is so significant and the potential for abuse so great that bank regulatory officials
have imposed substantial restrictions upon it. See, e.g., Distribution of Credit Life Insurance
Income, 12 C.F.R. § 2.4 (1983). The purposes of the regulation and need for it are discussed in 41
Fed. Reg. 29,846 (1976); 42 Fed. Reg. 48,518 (1977) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 2.4) (proposed July
20, 1976). The regulation was upheld in Independent Bankers Ass'n. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164
(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 823 (1980).
10. Sheffey, supra note 3, at 466.
11. R. SABLE & W. OGBURN, supra note 3, at 18; NCCF REPORT, supra note 6, at 85; Senate
Hearing, supra note 9, at 247-48.
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fers to the competition between insurance companies to offer the most
expensive policies rather than the least expensive. Creditors prefer the former
because the higher the premium, the greater the creditor's profit. In addition,
the cost of the total premium is charged up front, but the consumer pays the
premium in installments, incurring a finance charge on the insurance premi-
ums as well as on the loan principal. 12 Because there is no individual under-
writing, everyone is charged the same rate regardless of age or life
expectancy. 13 Thus, the insurance is more costly for younger borrowers than
for older and more costly for women than for men. Many consumers purchase
unneeded coverage. 14 They already are adequately insured, or if they die, the
unpaid debt will not adversely affect anyone except the bank. If they do need
or want insurance protection, purchasing regular long-term life insurance
from an independent agent provides greater coverage at a more economical
rate.15
If credit life insurance is an unwise purchase, why do almost all borrowers
obtain it? Many are not even aware they have bought it because it is sold as
part of a loan package. 16 Others believe it is required although usually it is
not.17 Still others mistakenly believe it is a sound investment. The cost per
month is quite small and since it is incidental to the loan, which is their princi-
pal focus of attention and concern, they do not engage in comparative shop-
ping to determine its true value.' 8
For some, credit insurance is advisable. For example, credit life may
make sense if the household's wage earner is using the loan to purchase a
necessity such as a car, the bank has taken a security interest in the car, the
deceased's estate will be small, and he or she wants the nonworking spouse to
be able to own the car free of the security interest. The purchase of credit life
insurance from the bank may be prudent in this case if the borrower cannot
obtain regular insurance for health reasons or if the borrower is elderly and
resides in a state that has imposed somewhat reasonable limits on credit insur-
ance rates.19 The consumer always benefits from credit insurance when bor-
rowing from the many credit unions and far fewer banks that do not charge
the consumer any fee for the insurance.
In the typical case the spouse of a deceased borrower alleges that the bor-
rower desired credit life insurance and believed the bank had purchased it.
The bank actually had not purchased insurance or had purchased a kind dif-
ferent from that which the borrower understood would be purchased. When
insurance is not procured, the situation is replete with ironies. If the borrower
12. Senate Hearing, supra note 9, at 6-7.
13. Id. at 12, 109.
14. Id. at 55.
15. Id at 6; Credit Insurance: The Quiet Overcharge, CONSUMER REP., July 1979, at 415, 417.
16. Senate Hearing, supra note 9, at 41, 47-48; R. SABLE & W. OGBURN, supra note 3, at 19;
E. WILLIAMS, CREDIT INSURANCE: A HANDBOOK FOR CONSUMERS 6 (1977).
17. R. SABLE & W. OGBURN, supra note 3, at 19.
18. Id.; NCCF REPORT, supra note 6, at 86.
19. Credit Insurance, supra note 15, at 417.
[Vol. 62
CREDIT LIFE INSURANCE
really wanted the insurance, he or she was probably making an unwise deci-
sion. The bank, far from seeking intentionally to frustrate the borrower's
wishes, would have been only too happy to sell the insurance to the debtor
since the bank profits so handsomely from the sale. Nevertheless, for some
reason the transaction was not completed and the borrower was not covered.
Although most consumers would be better off if banks frequently failed to
obtain and collect premiums for this insurance, the cases analyzed in this Arti-
cle involve those relatively rare instances in which the borrower dies and the
surviving spouse now claims the bank violated its duty by not obtaining
proper coverage. The legal source of that duty is crucial. If the duty arises
from a fiduciary relationship, banks may have to alter substantially their busi-
ness practices in the sale of credit life insurance.
II. THREE SOURCES OF THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP
This Article explores three lines of credit life insurance cases in which
courts have found a fiduciary relationship may exist between the consumer-
borrower and the bank at the time of procurement of the insurance. A review
of fiduciary law relevant to these three approaches will provide the necessary
doctrinal framework in which to analyze these cases.
The "most traditional" 20 fiduciary relationship exists when one person
"entrusts" another with his money or property21 with the understanding that
the latter will use the money for the benefit of and consistent with the desires
of the former. Although the latter now has title and control of the money, the
former is the beneficial owner. Consequently, the person possessing the
money must act consistent with the owner's interests. This approach is attrac-
tive because in the typical case it will not be too difficult to determine whether
there has been an entrusting of money.22 In credit life insurance transactions,
however, entrusting applies only to cases in which the customer has paid the
premium to the bank. In addition, in order for the bank entrusted with the
money to be held to fiduciary standards of conduct, it must bind itself in some
way.23 This requirement is met when there is a contractual relationship be-
tween the bank and the borrower. Courts are divided on when such a rela-
tionship exists. Even if there is a contract, the entrusting theory does not
20. J. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 52 (1981). Although fiduciary law has been
examined in the context of specific types of transactions, there have been few attempts to treat the
topic as a whole. See Jacobson, Essay-Capturing Fiduciary Obligation: Shepherd's Law of Fiduci-
aries, 3 CARDOzO L. REV. 519 (1982).
21. P. FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 89-90 (1977); Sealy, Fiduciary Relationshps, 1962
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 75. The fiduciary obligation is based on many trust principles, but has been
defined in a way that is broader than the formal trust and has been applied to circumstances well
beyond traditional trust situations. See generaly P. FINN, supra, at 89; Jacobson, supra note 20, at
520.
22. Eg., Hamby v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 217 F.2d 78, 80 (4th Cir. 1954); Commis-
sioner v. Owens, 78 F.2d 768, 773 (10th Cir. 1935); Manufacturers' Casualty Ins. Co. v. Mink, 129
NJ.L. 575, 578, 30 A.2d 510, 512 (1943).
23. J. SHEPHERD, supra note 20, at 65; P. FINN, supra note 21, at 107.
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address many issues that arise in these transactions. When it does apply, it is
unclear what responsibilities fiduciary status imposes on the bank.
A second basis for imposing fiduciary status arises when one party re-
poses trust and confidence in another. The cases that find a fiduciary relation-
ship based upon this theory require that there be an unequal relationship
between the parties, 24 that one party dominate the other, that the weaker party
rely on the stronger, and the stronger have the discretion to exploit his power
and take financial advantage of the weaker.25 The theory has been applied in
many instances in which the dominant party acts as an adviser.26 Since the
banker often is an adviser in the sale of credit life insurance, this approach
could be fruitful. This theory has been criticized, however, as being descrip-
tive rather than analytical:27 "ITjhis is a principle taken out of the air, an
ethical or moral imperative."28 It involves applying "a moral rule, as if i were
a legalrule, to determine legal rather than moral consequences. '' 29 It has been
recommended that the better approach is to "identify a legal rule that furthers
this moral imperative .... -30 In addition, often it is difficult to determine
from the facts whether trust and confidence have been reposed because the
theory is so vague.3' It has been applied in cases in which the weaker party
has not actually placed trust and confidence in the other.32 Finally, the theory
can be criticized for not providing guidance about what responsibilities flow
from the fiduciary status.
33
Courts often have rejected arguments that a fiduciary relationship exists
by finding that there was an arm's length relationship between the parties, 34
that the plaintiff failed to prove both parties understood a special trust or con-
fidence had been reposed,35 or that neither party reasonably could expect that
the alleged fiduciary would act "solely or primarily" on behalf of the party
claiming breach of a fiduciary duty.3
6
The credit life insurance cases relying on the trust and confidence ap-
24. See Umbaugh Pole Bldg. Co. v. Scott, 58 Ohio St. 2d 282, 287, 390 N.E.2d 320, 323
(1979); J. SHEPHERD, supra note 20, at 61; Wolinsky & Econome, Seduction in Wonderland- The
Needfor a Seller's Fiduciary Duty Toward Children, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 249, 266 (1977).
25. J. SHEPHERD, supra note 20, at 84; Wolinsky & Econome, supra note 24, at 266,
26. J. SHEPHERD, supra note 20, at 28-32.
27. Id. at 63.
28. Id. at 57.
29. Id at 57 n.36; but see Shepherd's acknowledgment that "in all fiduciary situations we are,
whether we intend to or not, making a moral judgment." Id at 60. See also Wolinsky &
Econome, supra note 24, at 265.
30. J. SHEPHERD, supra note 20, at 57 n.36.
31. Id at 59. Because it is difficult to determine whether trust and confidence have been
reposed, some courts impose a heavy burden of proof upon the party seeking to establish the
fiduciary relationship. See, e.g., Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 166 F.2d 651, 653 (7th Cir. 1948).
32. J. SHEPHERD, supra note 20, at 58.
33. Id at 63.
34. E.g., Umbaugh Pole Bldg. Co. v. Scott, 58 Ohio St. 2d 282, 287, 390 N.E.2d 320, 323
(1979).
35. Id. at 286, 390 N.E.2d at 323.




proach provide a testing ground for the criticisms of the theory and illustrate
the extent to which some courts have departed from the traditional application
of this theory.
Finally, the third basis for imposing a fiduciary status arises when the
facts indicate two parties are in certain relationships, such as attorney-client,
guardian-ward, executor-heir, and principal-agent. The principal-agent rela-
tionship will be described and explored at length in this Article because of its
applicablility to the sale of credit life insurance. Finding fiduciary status on
this basis has several advantages. Because objective facts determine whether a
person was an agent,37 there is less uncertainty about when the relationship
exists than under the trust and confidence approach. If the relationship is
present, a well-developed body of law delineates the duties that are imposed
upon the fiduciary. The agent's powerful position justifies imposing these du-
ties. Courts impose fiduciary duties upon agents because the agents have the
discretion to take actions on behalf of their principal that may affect the legal
position of the principal.38 The imposition of stringent responsibilities pre-
vents the agent from abusing his discretion. Although the laws of agency and
trust and confidence are separate and distinct, commentators have noted the
commonality of the two.39 In a sense, the principal has put his trust or confi-
dence in his agent. In contrast to the trust and confidence approach, however,
agency law provides a set of legal rules, not just a moral imperative.
III. THE FAILURE TO PROCURE INSURANCE: CONTRACT AND ENTRUSTING
AS BASES FOR THE FIDUCIARY STATUS
The entrusting theory of fiduciary law applies when there is a contract
between the borrower and the bank to procure credit life insurance and the
borrower has paid all or a portion of the premium to the bank. The contract is
the vehicle by which the borrower transfers powers to the bank.40 Some courts,
however, have never reached the fiduciary issue because they have found that
no contractual relationship exists because the customer and the bank never
signed a formal agreement in which the bank promised to purchase the
insurance.
On the surface one would assume that this question could be resolved
easily by judicial application of neutral contract rules. The courts are divided,
however, because along with other documents most consumers are presented
not only with a Truth in Lending disclosure statement explaining that credit
life insurance is not required but also are provided a statement such as "I
37. See infra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
38. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 4 (1975); see J. SHEPHERD,
supra note 20, at 98. One commentator has noted that the grant of power by the principal to the
agent is analogous to a trust. Seavey, The Rationale of4gency, 29 YALE L.J. 859, 863 (1920).
39. E. HUFFCUTT, THE LAW OF AGENCY 7 (2d ed. 1901); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF AGENCY AS A BRANCH OF COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME JURISPRUDENCE 12-13 (9th ed.
1882).
40. See generally J. SHEPHERD, supra note 20, at 99.
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desire credit life insurance," under which they place their signatures. 41 Con-
sumers have contended that the disclosure and the signature created a contract
obligating the bank to procure the insurance. The bank's failure to do so
could constitute a breach of contract for which the bank may be liable. While
some courts accept this argument and will impose fiduciary duties when pre-
miums have been paid, others have rejected it. The decisions illustrate very
different judicial approaches toward the relationship between customers and
banks and demonstrate the need for a general conceptual approach that looks
beyond the narrow question whether a contract to buy insurance existed.
Some courts have refused to find the bank liable even though the bor-
rower signed the disclosure. The opinion of the district court in Burgess v.
Charlottesville Savings andLoan42 typifies this approach. In Burgess a widow
sued on a contract theory because of the lender's failure to purchase credit
insurance when her mortgage was approved. Pursuant to the credit transac-
tion, the lender presented to the borrowers a Truth in Lending disclosure state-
ment that informed them of the cost of credit life and disability insurance.
The statement said, among other things: "No charge is made for such insur-
ance and no such insurance isprovided unless the borrower signs the appropriate
statement below. " 43 The "appropriate statement," "I desire Credit Life & Dis-
ablity Income insurance coverage," was signed by the widow and her hus-
band.44 No formal application for credit insurance was filled out.
The court rejected the widow's contention that the signed Truth in Lend-
ing statement constituted an agreement by the bank to procure credit life in-
surance. The court found no agreement because the bank was not authorized
by the insurance company to procure insurance unless the borrower completed
an application. 45 The borrower was "charged, at law" with notice of the
bank's incapacity to purchase insurance under these circumstances. 46 The role
of the Truth in Lending statement was limited. It was not "intended to form a
contract to procure insurance."'47 Rather, it merely notified the lender of the
borrower's interest in credit insurance and as such is "part of the preliminary
negotiations leading to a contract to procure insurance rather than a contract
41. To increase the attractiveness of the loan, creditors keep the finance charge as low as
possible. The Federal Truth in Lending Act and accompanying Regulation Z provide that the
lender need not include the cost of credit insurance in the finance charge, provided two conditions
are met. First, purchase of the insurance must be voluntary. Second, the lender must provide a
written statement disclosing that insurance is not required and indicating its cost. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1605(c) (1976); 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(d) (1983). In addition, the consumer must "give specific af-
firmative written indication of his desire" to purchase the insurance. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(b)(2)
(1976). For transactions entered into prior to Oct. 1, 1982, the consumer also had to give a
specifically dated and separately signed indication of his desire for insurance. 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.4(a)(5)(ii), repealed by 46 Fed. Reg. 20,848 (1981)
42. 349 F. Supp. 133 (W.D. Va. 1972) vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss, 477
F.2d 40 (4th Cir. 1973).
43. Id. at 135-36 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 136.
45. Id. at 137.
46. Id. This presumption that consumer borrowers know the law was rejected in Hutson v.
Wenatchee Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 22 Wash. App. 91, 100, 588 P.2d 1192, 1197 (1978).
47. Burgess, 349 F. Supp. at 140.
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itself."48 Its function is merely to "exchange information." 49 Consequently,
any agreement to procure insurance would arise from an offer and acceptance
that might occur after the disclosures in the statement.50 The court found that
the statement could not constitute the meeting of the minds necessary to form
a contract because the statement omitted many of the terms that a contract to
procure insurance must contain.5 ' Finally, the court found that even if the
parties had made a contract to purchase insurance, the bank could not be held
liable for breach of the contract since Virginia law made it impossible for the
bank to perform the contract unless the borrower had submitted an
application.
5 2
The precedential value of this opinion is questionable in several respects.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district
court, with instructions that it be remanded to the state court from which the
Fourth Circuit found it had been improperly removed. The court ruled that
whether the language in the lending statement created a contractual right was
a question of state law.53 Furthermore, Burgess can be distinguished on its
facts. The loan was for the purchase of a home with a payback period of
twenty-five years. The court found that purchasing credit life insurance for
real estate mortgages is not the usual practice. The bank did not have a group
policy; rather it accepted only individual applications which it forwarded to an
insurance carrier. In addition, several requirements of Virginia law made this
a particularly difficult case in which to find the bank liable. A different factual
setting is presented by cases arising outside of Virginia that involve loans other
than real estate loans, in which the bank typically has a group policy and
almost every borrower buys credit life insurance.
Finally, the district court's contractual analysis is suspect. In finding no
contract to procure insurance, the court did not give due regard to well-estab-
lished contract rules. For example, a party's secret intent is immaterial. If a
reasonable person would understand conduct as importing a promise to per-
form an act, the actor will be held to the promise.54 Whether there was a
meeting of the minds is determined by whether the parties' conduct indicates
an agreement.55 Courts which believe that the parties' conduct demonstrated
an intention to form a contract look with disfavor upon the argument that an
agreement does not contain sufficient detail, and reject contracts for indefinite-
ness only as a last resort.
5 6
In Burgess certain facts indicated the parties intended to form a contract
48. Id.
49. Id. at 141.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 140.
52. Id.
53. Burgess v. Charlottesville Say. & Loan Ass'n, 477 F.2d 40, 44 (4th Cir. 1973).
54. E.g., Hudson v. Columbian Transfer Co., 137 Mich. 255, 100 N.W. 402 (1904).
55. Eg., Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 Va. 493, 84 S.E.2d 516 (1954).
56. E.g., Wedtke Realty Corp. v. Karanas, 286 A.D. 339, 143 N.Y.S.2d 198, a4d, 309 N.Y.
904, 131 N.E.2d 579 (1955).
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to procure insurance. The bank presented the borrower with a document stat-
ing: "I desire Credit Life & Disability Income insurance coverage." 57 The
borrower signed below that statement. The document also said the insurance
would cost $11.95 per month. The borrower completed and signed a "State-
ment of Loan Settlement," which itemized various charges that made up the
monthly installment payment. One item was a charge of $11.95 for "Mutual
Mortgage Insurance.
58
The district court did not seriously consider these facts and the possibility
that a contract had been formed. It declared that the Truth in Lending disclo-
sure "was not intended to form a contract to procure insurance"5 9 without
explaining to whose intent it was referring. It did not examine the bank's in-
tent as manifested by the paper the bank had the consumer sign, or its failure
at that time to do anything to counter the borrower's reasonable expectation
that the bank was agreeing to purchase credit insurance. The court found no
contractual meeting of the minds because of the lack of detail in the Truth in
Lending disclosure.6
0
There can, however, be a meeting of the minds as long as the parties
manifest the intention to form a contract to procure insurance. Although a
document may be so devoid of detail that it indicates there was no intention to
enter into an agreement, the complexity of insurance coupled with consumers'
ignorance of insurance terms make it doubtful that any contract to procure
could meet the court's requirement that the parties "achieve mutual agreement
of the terms."' 61 The court pointed out that the disclosure statement did not
indicate from which insurance carrier the bank would procure insurance.62 It
seemed to insist that this omission constituted a fatal lack of specificity. This
reasoning is contrary to general insurance law.63 Moreover, most consumers
probably do not know one credit insurance company from another, and do not
care which one is used unless the cost and coverage varies from one to an-
other. The district court in Burgess, however, implied that notice of the name
of the company, regardless whether that information will have any effect on
the consumer's intention to enter into an agreement, must be stated in the
contract. The court failed to adhere to the general approach of courts not to
find absence of a contractual relationship due to insufficient detail.64 The
court should have tested the adequacy of the disclosure by ascertaining
whether the obligations of the parties were reasonably certain and the terms
were definite enough to enable the court to determine whether the obligations
had been or could be performed.
65
57. Burgess, 349 F. Supp. at 136.
58. Id.




63. R. KEETON, BAsIc TExT ON INSURANCE LAW 52 (1971).
64. Eg., Wedtke Realty Corp. v. Karanas, 286 A.D. 339, 143 N.Y.S.2d 198, aI'd, 309 N.Y.
904, 131 N.E.2d 579 (1955).
65. See Heldenbrand v. Stevenson, 249 F.2d 424, 427 (10th Cir. 1957).
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Rather than looking at the intention of the parties as manifested by their
conduct and applying traditional principles, the court charged the borrower
"with knowledge of the steps necessary to make a contract of insurance"
66
under Virginia law, and charged them with notice of the bank's lack of author-
ity to procure insurance without an application. Apparently the consumers
also were charged with knowledge of the role of the Truth in Lending state-
ment in forming contracts to procure credit insurance and the relationship be-
tween the statement and state statutes, even though the court cited no
authority to support its interpretation of the relationship.
The Maryland Supreme Court in Peer v. First Federal Savings and Loan
Association67 also rejected the claim that the lender was liable for failure to
purchase credit insurance despite the borrowers having indicated a desire for
the insurance on the Truth in Lending disclosure statement. The court, rely-
ing on Burgess, found no contract. 68 The facts in Peer were significantly dif-
ferent, however, and the court could have found no contract without adopting
Burgess' myopic approach. Unlike the disclosure statement in Burgess, the
statement in Peer disclosed no cost for the insurance. 69 That item was left
blank. In addition, at the time of the loan commitment the S&L sent the bor-
rowers a letter urging them to purchase credit insurance, stating the cost would
be included in the monthly payment "if you adopt the plan,"70 and informing
them the S&L had arranged for a life insurance salesman to visit them and
talk about the specifics since the S&L was not in the business of selling life
insurance.7 1 The salesman never came. From these facts the court acted rea-
sonably in finding that the borrower had no reasonable expectation of insur-
ance coverage despite the implication of the Truth in Lending statement.
Other courts have repudiated Burgess by giving greater effect to the Truth
in Lending disclosure statement. In Burgess the lender contended and the dis-
trict court agreed that the function of the disclosure statement is to provide the
borrower with information on the cost of credit prior to entering into a con-
tractual relationship and that the disclosure statement could not be considered
to be a contract to procure insurance. In Sutton v. First National Bank7 2 the
Tennessee Court of Appeals adopted the Fourth Circuit's determination 73 that
the disclosure statement could be the "basis for the creation of a contract" to
purchase insurance.74 The bank argued that it was not liable when it inadver-
tently failed to purchase credit insurance because the only reason it included
the disclosure statement was to comply with the Truth in Lending Act, and it
never intended the statement to be regarded as an offer to buy insurance. The
66. Burgess, 349 F. Supp. at 137.
67. 273 Md. 610, 331 A.2d 299 (1975).
68. Id. at 615, 331 A.2d at 302.
69. Id. at 612, 331 A.2d at 300.
70. Id. at 613, 331 A.2d at 300.
71. Id.
72. 620 S.W.2d 526 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
73. Burgess, 477 F.2d 40 (4th Cir. 1973).
74. Sutton, 620 S.W.2d at 529.
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court rejected the bank's contentions, pointing out that, unlike the situation in
Burgess, the consumer in Sutton was not required to complete a separate
credit insurance application. 75 The language used in the disclosure statement
clearly and unambiguously constituted an offer to purchase insurance. Given
this language, the bank's unexpressed intention with regard to the disclosure
was immaterial. When the consumer signed below the line that read, "I do
desire Credit Life Insurance," he accepted the bank's offer.76 The bank did
not deduct the insurance premium from the loan or separately bill the con-
sumer for the premium. In fact, the loan officer failed to notice that the con-
sumer had signed the form indicating his desire to buy insurance and the
matter of credit insurance had never been discussed by the borrower and any
employees of the bank. The court attached no legal significance to these cir-
cumstances. What mattered was that the bank had made an offer that the
customer had accepted.
77
In Parnell v. First Savings and Loan78 the borrower signed the disclosure
statement and orally informed the bank officer he wanted to buy credit insur-
ance. The borrower paid the bank the first year's premium and the cost of the
second year's premium was added to the monthly payment schedule. The
bank failed to purchase the insurance. A separate credit life insurance appli-
cation was required but the bank employee forgot to have the consumer sign
it. The omission of the consumer's signature on the application apparently
was the reason for the bank's failure to purchase the insurance, but the bank
not only neglected to return the money paid for the first year's premium, but
also accepted four monthly payments that included a charge for the second
year's premiums before the borrower died. The court distinguished Peer in
particular because in Peer the papers given to the consumer never contained
any charge for credit insurance and no premiums were ever paid by the con-
sumers.79 The Parnell court held that there was a contract between the parties
that obligated the bank to purchase insurance.80 In addition, the court found
that the bank stood in a fiduciary capacity that obligated it to use the money
paid by the consumers to buy insurance.8' Although not explained in the
opinion, the court may have been applying the doctrine that a fiduciary rela-
tionship arises when one entrusts another with his property.82
The wider scope of analysis employed in Sutton and Parnell provides a
welcome alternative to the Burgess court's narrow approach. First, their anal-
yses more appropriately recognize the elements involved in these transactions.
These transactions may involve both oral representations regarding the
75. Id. at 530.
76. Id. at 531.
77. Id. at 532.
78. 336 So. 2d 764 (Miss. 1976).
79. Id. at 766-67.
80. Id. at 768.
81. Id. at 767-68.
82. See generally Central Stock & Grain Exch. v. Bendinger, 109 F. 926, 929 (7th Cir.) (ap-
plying agency theory), cert. denied, 183 U.S. 699 (1901); Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 813-15, 113
So. 419, 422 (1927) (applying constructive trust theory); J. SHEPHERD, supra note 20, at 52.
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purchase of insurance, papers that look like contracts to reasonable consum-
ers, and representations and conduct after the loan was made that bear upon
the question before the court. The Burgess court focused on the absence of an
insurance application. Since the insurance company never received a com-
pleted application the court refused to hold the bank liable even though the
customers had indicated their intention to acquire insurance through the bank.
The court ignored the issues concerning the bank's appropriate responsibilities
based on its conduct with its customer. In Parnell the court refused to bury its
head in the sand; instead it looked at what actually happened between the
bank and the borrower to decide if a greater responsibility should be imposed
on the bank.
The Parnell court faced the easiest factual setting because Parnell was the
only case in which the borrower paid the premium. The bank was in a diffi-
cult position-trying to argue it could avoid liability for failing to buy insur-
ance when it charged for and collected insurance premiums. There was a
potential sticking point, however, in the consumer's failure to sign the credit
insurance application. The insurance company probably required a signed
application before it would agree to insure the borrower. The bank officer
testified he sent the borrower a letter urging him to sign the application and
mentioned it to the borrower when he saw him at a meeting.83 On the other
hand, the borrower's widow denied the letter was received and asserted that
her husband believed he was covered. The court did not attach any signifi-
cance to these factual disputes. Nor did the court indicate that it would sym-
pathize with the contention that it is the responsibility of the borrower to sign
an insurance application. Instead, the court felt that it was the bank's obliga-
tion to make sure the consumer signed; having failed to do so, the bank was
liable. Merely sending a letter and postponing the purchase of insurance un-
less and until the consumer takes the required action was not sufficient.
It is not clear, however, what the bank should have done. Although the
court said the bank had a duty to purchase insurance, the bank may not have
been able to do so without a signed application. Consequently, the decision
may implicitly impose upon the bank the duty to obtain the consumer's signa-
ture through affirmative action beyond sending a letter. This might require
sending a notice that clearly informs the consumer of the consequences of fail-
ing to sign the application; it may require sending the notice by registered or
certified mail; it may even require a personal visit to the debtor's home or
place of business.
If this is what the court had in mind, it obviously was imposing duties far
beyond those demanded by holding that a contractual relationship existed. If
the court had gone only as far as Sutton, and simply found a contractual rela-
tionship that imposed an obligation to purchase insurance, then a curt letter
advising the borrower of the need to complete an application might be suffi-
83. Parnell, 336 So. 2d at 765.
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dent. If the bank is a fiduciary, however, it may have the obligation to take
the vigorous action suggested above.
The Parnell court held the bank responsible for the customer's failure to
sign the application and refused to attach importance to the letter that the
bank allegedly sent. In so doing, the court ignored the obstacles facing a bank
charged with buying insurance when the insured has not signed the policy.
Instead, Parnell cast the bank as a fiduciary with the responsibility of taking
the necessary steps to purchase insurance for its customer.
In Parnell the court forced the bank to observe fiduciary responsibilities
because the consumer had paid the premium. The question arises whether
paying the premium should be determinative. For example, suppose the facts
are the same except for payment. That is, the consumer orally informs the
banker he wants to buy credit insurance. He signs the disclosure statement,
which asserts that he desires credit insurance. He neglects to sign the credit
insurance application. But instead of paying the first year's premium, he signs
a contract requiring him to pay the premiums in monthly installments. The
bank fails to purchase credit life insurance because the application is not
signed; the debtor dies before the first installment is due. Under Sutton a con-
tractual relationship has been created, but this would impose no extraordinary
duties upon the bank in regard to the unsigned application. The Parnell court
would reach the same result because the fiduciary relationship was dependent
upon the bank having received premiums, and none were received in the situa-
tion posed here.
Should the bank's obligation to obtain a signed insurance application be
any less merely because no money for insurance was paid at the time the bor-
rower died? It is unreasonable to rest the bank's duty on whether a premium
has been paid when every other facet of the bank-borrower relationship is the
same. Yet exclusive reliance on the entrusting approach seems to require this
distinction, for only if money is paid can the analysis break out of the limits of
contract obligations and into those of fiduciary relationships. Consequently, it
is necessary to examine alternative approaches to analyzing the legal relation-
ship between banks and consumer borrowers. In addition, the cases discussed
above involved the failure of the bank to purchase credit insurance. Consum-
ers, however, face several other difficulties when purchasing this type of insur-
ance. The cases discussed above do not provide guidance for a more general
approach that would apply to these other situations.
IV. THE BANKER AS FIDUCIARY: REPOSING TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN
THE BANKER
Recent cases from Ohio and Washington have gone far beyond a contract
and entrusting analysis and have radically altered the traditional legal rela-
tionship between the bank and the consumer borrower. Ordinarily, when a
bank loans money it has the superior legal status of a creditor; the borrower is
in the inferior position of a debtor. As a lender the bank has the minimal
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duties to act in good faith84 and to refrain from misrepresenting the terms of
the loan.8 5 In a few cases, the courts have upset this relationship by imposing
fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duties upon the bank for the sale of credit life
insurance pursuant to a loan on the theory that the borrower placed trust and
confidence in the bank. Unlike the contract and entrusting approach, applica-
tion of this fiduciary doctrine is not unduly narrow. The courts that have
taken this tack, however, have done violence to fiduciary concepts and im-
posed an onerous burden on the banks.
A. Ohio-The Banker as Fiduciary
As described in part II, before finding that a person is a fiduciary because
another has placed trust and confidence in him, courts require proof that the
parties did not deal at arm's length and that the parties knew or should have
known that one party would act primarily on behalf of the other. The Ohio
Supreme Court adhered to these rules in a 1979 case, Umbaugh Pole Building
Co. v. Scott,8 6 in which a financial institution provided substantial advice and
counseling to the debtors. Because the parties dealt at arm's length and the
borrowers should have realized the institution was acting on its own behalf,
the court held that no fiduciary relationship existed.
Despite Umbaugh's holding, two years later the same court found a
fiduciary relationship to exist between a bank customer and an institutional
lender in the case of Stone v. Davis.87 Judy and Danny Davis applied for a
mortgage to finance their purchase of a dairy farm. The Ashtabula Savings
and Loan Association approved their application and provided them with a
Truth in Lending disclosure statement similar to that used by most lenders.
The disclosure form included a paragraph that stated, among other things, that
no credit life insurance "is provided unless the borrower signs the appropriate
statement below." Further down on the form was the statement, "I desire in-
surance coverage," followed by two blank lines for the borrower's signature
and the date. The S&L typed "mortgage" onto the blank space in the state-
ment, and Danny Davis signed and dated on the lines provided under the
statement.88 The S&L did not purchase insurance and did not advise Davis
that he would be responsible for purchasing his own coverage. Consequently,
when Davis died and his wife defaulted, the loan was not insured.
The Ohio Supreme Court justified finding a fiduciary relationship in
Stone, despite its contrary holding in Umbaugh, on the basis that "the facts
are different."'89 While admittedly the facts are different, it appears the court
may also have changed the test for finding a fiduciary relationship.
84. Liebergesell v. Evans, 93 Wash. 2d 881, 892, 613 P.2d 1170, 1177 (1980); National Bank v.
Equity Investors, 81 Wash. 2d 886, 920, 506 P.2d 20, 41 (1973).
85. See Hutson v. Wanatchee Fed. Say. & Loan, 22 Wash. App. 91, 588 P.2d 1192 (1978).
86. 58 Ohio St. 2d 282, 390 N.E.2d 320 (1979).
87. 66 Ohio St. 2d 74, 419 N.E.2d 1094, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981).
88. Id. at 75, 419 N.E.2d at 1096.
89. Id. at 78, 419 N.E.2d at 1097.
1984]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The court defined a fiduciary relationship as "one in which special confi-
dence and trust is reposed in the integrity and fidelity of another and there is a
resulting position of superiority and influence, acquired by virtue of this spe-
cial trust." 90 The court then reiterated the Umbaugh test: "A fiduciary rela-
tionship . . . may arise out of an informal relationship where both parties
understand that a special trust or confidence has been reposed." 91
The court proceeded to apply its definition and test to the facts before it.
In Umbaugh the court's refusal to find a fiduciary relationship was based, in
part, on the parties' arm's length relationship. In Stone the court reaffirmed
the importance of the parties' relationship by asserting that a fiduciary rela-
tionship is present when one party has a position of "superiority and influ-
ence" over the other.92 The court acknowledged that when a customer
negotiates the terms and conditions of a loan with a bank, they can be pre-
sumed to "stand at arm's length," and no fiduciary relationship exists. The
court found that once the terms and conditions are agreed upon, however, the
transaction enters a new stage that it called "loan processing." One aspect of
loan processing includes "advising the customer as to the benefits of procuring
mortgage insurance on the property which secures the bank's loan."'93 The
court found that during loan processing the parties no longer have equal bar-
gaining power.
The court appears to have laid down the following rule: When credit
insurance is discussed during the loan processing stage, the parties are in an
unequal bargaining relationship. Speaking in general terms about a bank and
its customer, the court made the bald assertion: "[l]t is unrealistic to believe
that this equality of position (present when the terms of the loan are negoti-
ated) carries over into the area of loan processing . . . 94 The court then
sought to support its declaration that the parties were unequal by noting vari-
ous factors present in the case. But the court's language strongly suggests that
the customers had not presented facts that proved inequality of bargaining
power. Rather, the court seems to have decided that as a matter of policy this
inequality should be regarded as a question of law, not one of fact for which
the customer had the burden of proof.95
The court's difficulty in finding facts that support the reposing of trust and
confidence is shared by others applying this theory.96 Determining inequality
as a question of law seems to support the suggestion that courts often apply
90. Id. at 78, 419 N.E.2d at 1097-98.
91. Id. at 78, 419 N.E.2d at 1098. Other courts have found a reposing of trust and confidence
between a bank and a customer when the transaction did not involve the sale of credit life insur-
ance. See, e.g., Pigg v. Robertson, 549 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. 1977); Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 49
Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101 (1937)(dictum).
92. 66 Ohio St. 2d. at 78, 419 N.E.2d at 1098.
93. Id. at 79, 419 N.E.2d at 1098.
94. Id. at 78-79, 419 N.E.2d at 1098.
95. See generally Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CALIF. L.
REv. 1867 (1966).
96. J. SHEPHERD, supra note 20, at 59.
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moral rules rather than legal rules in these cases.97
The court's opinion in Stone is unclear about the lender's role in advising
the Davises about credit insurance. The court states generally that banks cus-
tomarily advise customers about the benefits of buying insurance. Later, the
court states that the lender in the instant case "failed to adhere to its custom-
ary policy of informing the Davises that they must procure the mortgage in-
surance themselves ... ."98 The court's meaning is unclear. It may be say-
ing the bank was negligent because it failed to follow its customary policy. Or
it might have decided that regardless of this lender's policy, it is customary for
banks to advise their customers on this topic and it was negligence for the
lender not to do so. The court asserts the lender "broached the subject of
mortgage insurance and elicited an expressed desire for it by Danny Davis
.... "99 From the specific facts recited in the opinion, however, it appears
the only action taken by the lender was presenting the Davises with the Truth
in Lending disclosure statement.
Nevertheless, having "broached the subject" and obtained Davis' signa-
ture, "both sides to the loan transaction must have understood that a special
trust or confidence had been reposed in Ashtabula S&L to advise and assist
the Davises in procuring the insurance."'' 1 As with the issue of equality of
bargaining power, the court apparently decided this issue as a matter of law
rather than finding certain facts had been proven. No evidence was identified
that indicates how much the S&L knew of the borrower's circumstances.
While the bank may have known that the couple were young and inexperi-
enced dairy farmers, the court recited no representations made by the Davises
to the effect that they were at a loss to comprehend the transaction and were
relying upon the expertise of the loan officer. These dairy farmers appear sim-
ilar to the bank customers in Umbaugh, in which the borrowers were hog
farmers and unfamiliar with this kind of transaction. They put trust and confi-
dence in, and relied upon, the expertise of the Association, a farmer's coopera-
tive established and chartered pursuant to a federal law to assist farmers.
In Umbaugh the court partially based its finding of no fiduciary relation-
ship upon the determination that the financial institution was acting primarily
on behalf of itself rather than the debtor. In Stone the court ignored this part
of its prior opinion and instead pointed to the S&L's self-interest to support its
holding. The court noted that banks do not act as "disinterested experts"'101
when they give advice on mortgage insurance. They have a financial interest
in giving this advice since the purchase of this insurance protects the bank's
investment and the bank is paid a commission for every policy its customers
buy. The legal significance of the bank's financial interest is not clear from the
opinion. The court may have considered that the bank's self-interest sup-
97. Id. at 57.
98. Stone, 66 Ohio St. 2d at 79, 419 N.E.2d at 1098.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 80, 419 N.E.2d at 1098.
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ported finding a fiduciary relationship between the bank and the customer.
On the other hand, the court may have referred to the bank's self-interest to
support finding it fair to impose upon the bank the duty to disclose the advisa-
bility of purchasing the insurance, and procedure for obtaining it, when a
fiduciary relationship exists. If the court used the bank's self-interest to sup-
port its finding that there was a fiduciary relationship, that would be in direct
conflict with the standard, set forth in Umbaugh, that the bank act primarily
on behalf of the borrower in order to establish this relationship. On the other
hand, the court may have meant to reject this element as a relevant considera-
tion in determining whether the bank is a fiduciary.' 02 In other words, the
court may have ruled that a fiduciary relationship exists if the other character-
istics of that relationship are present, regardless of whether the bank acted
primarily on behalf of the borrower. In this case, the bank's profiting from the
sale of the insurance supports the reasonableness of imposing fiduciary duties
upon it.
The result in Stone is fair; unfortunately, the court's reasoning makes it
impossible to discern what standards the court will apply in future cases, and
which party must prove what elements. The fairness of the Stone result is
evident from each of two perspectives. First, the transactional setting was one
in which a customer could reasonably expect he had completed the steps nec-
essary to purchase credit insurance and the bank would do the rest, and also
one in which the bank should have realized the customer's expectations. Sec-
ond, the result is consistent with the view that loss should fall upon the party
who can prevent harm at the lower cost. Credit insurance is a complex subject
for a person not familiar with credit and insurance. The customer who takes
out a single loan would incur substantial transaction costs to be fully informed
about the rights and obligations of each party in regard to such insurance.
Bank personnel make many loans every day. Loan officers have to be knowl-
edgeable about credit insurance in order to perform their jobs, and having
obtained that knowledge once, can disclose the information customers need at
no or little additional transaction costs. Consequently, the bank can prevent
harm at a lower cost than the customers.
Despite the fairness of the result, th6 court's reasoning creates considera-
ble confusion. First, the scope of the decision is unclear. While the holding
applies only to the purchase of credit life insurance, banks may also find them-
selves in a fiduciary relationship when advising customers about other aspects
of the loan processing stage since the court assumes customers are not in an
equal bargaining position during this stage. Second, it is not clear how the
court regards the advice and counseling role of banks. Umbaugh presented
102. Some other cases seem to agree that this element is irrelevant. See, e.g, First Nat'l Bank
v. Brown, 181 N.W.2d 178, 182 (Iowa 1970) (Relationship of trust and confidence may be present
even though trusted party does not act primarily on behalf of other party. If trusted party has
superior knowledge of facts, he must "disclose all material facts of which he is aware, or at least
those favorable to his own position and adverse to the other."); Commercial Credit Plan, Inc. v.
Beebe, 123 Vt. 317, 321, 187 A.2d 502, 506 (1963) (lender in a position of trust and confidence, has
a duty of full disclosure).
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the question whether the giving of advice and counseling might impose on a
financial institution the responsibilities of a fiduciary. Although the court re-
fused to hold that the advice and counseling provided in that case gave rise to
the fiduciary relationship, the court did not reject the possibility that advice
and counseling might have this effect under other circumstances. As discussed
above, it is not clear what those circumstances are. Stone did not clarify these
matters because it involved advice and counseling in a very different context.
In that case, the banks' error was in not providing advice and counseling, since
the court held that when a financial institution is in the position of a fiduciary,
one of the resulting duties is to provide that service.
This creates a dilemma for banks during loan transactions that do not
involve credit insurance. If the bank advises its customers, a court may find it
to be in a fiduciary relationship. If the bank does not advise its customers, the
court may determine that the bank was a fiduciary and violated its duty by not
giving advice. Finally, the test for determining whether the bank is a fiduciary
is uncertain. Stone appears to reject the requirement that there be a reason-
able expectation the bank would act solely or primarily on behalf of the
debtor. The court's failure to refer to Umbaugh in that part of its opinion is
unsettling. In addition, if Stone did reject Umbaugh's test, it is not clear what
test replaced it.
The Ohio Supreme Court was provided the opportunity to clarify these
matters in Walters v. First National Bank of Newark.10 3 In Walters a husband
and wife applied for credit life insurance. The wife alleged that the loan of-
ficer told them the insurance was effective as of the date they executed the
mortgage note and filled out the insurance application. She also alleged that
the monthly installment payments assessed by the bank included a premium
for the insurance. The insurance application provided that the insurance
would not go into effect until a policy was issued. No policy was ever issued;
the insurance company returned the application to the bank because the
Walterses had failed to indicate the husband's occupation. The day before the
policy was returned the husband died. The court of appeals upheld the trial
court's denial of the Walterses' motion for summary judgment and allowance
of the bank's motion for judgment on the pleading.
The state supreme court reversed, remanding the case to the trial court.
Because of the procedural posture of the litigation, the court merely held that
the wife had a legally cognizable cause of action. In the course of making this
holding, however, it shed some light on the questions raised by Stone. In Wal-
ters the court quoted the following passage from Stone: "The facts surround-
ing and the setting in which a bank gives advice to a loan customer on the
subject of mortgage insurance warrant a conclusion that, in this aspect of the
mortgage loan process, the bank acts as its customer's fiduciary . . . . "'4
The court went on to declare: "The fiduciary nature, at least in this respect, of
the bank-customer relationship is predicated upon the bank's superior conver-
103. 69 Ohio St. 2d 677, 433 N.E.2d 608 (1982).
104. Id. at 679, 433 N.E.2d at 610 (quoting Stone, 66 Ohio St. 2d at 78, 419 N.E.2d at 1098).
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sance with the area of loan processing, of which mortgage insurance is a com-
ponent."' 0 5 It appears from the foregoing that the court found, as a matter of
law, that in any loan application in which credit insurance is involved, the
bank is a fiduciary. The court next referred again to Stone for a description of
the bank's duty as a fiduciary. The court declared that once a customer has
indicated his desire for immediate insurance coverage, the bank must advise
the customer "how to proceed" to obtain the coverage.'
0 6
It seems all the customer must prove on remand is that she and her hus-
band applied for credit life insurance and told the loan officer they wanted the
insurance to be effective on the date of the loan, or were told by the officer that
it would be effective on that date. This will be sufficient to establish the fiduci-
ary status of the bank. Next, she need only show that the bank: (1) did not
purchase insurance that was effective on that date, and (2) did not advise them
of its failure to make the purchase. Having shown these facts, she will have
proved the bank breached its fiduciary duty by acting negligently. The cus-
tomer does not have to prove that the bank had superior knowledge of, and
experience with, credit insurance, or that both parties understood or should
have understood a special trust or confidence had been reposed in the bank.
The customer does not also have to show that she and her husband reasonably
expected the bank would act solely or primarily on their behalf.
While the Stone and Walters opinions may look like radical departures
from traditional doctrine, future Ohio decisions may limit the scope of Stone
and Walters even in transactions involving credit insurance. In both cases the
court arguably could have found the bank liable in its normal creditor status,
based on a theory of misrepresentation. This was explicitly acknowledged in
Walters when the court pointed out that the wife's complaint alleged misrep-
resentation and that an action would lie on this theory.' 0 7 If so, the bank's
"duty of fair disclosure" is triggered only when the bank has made a misrepre-
sentation upon which the customer may rely to his detriment.
On the other hand, Stone can be read much more expansively. Unlike
Walters, it did not treat the transaction as one involving misrepresentation.
The court required fair disclosure of the mechanics of purchasing insurance
whenever insurance is mentioned in the bank's written documents, or by the
bank's employees, and the customer expresses a desire for the insurance. The
bank is obligated to do this regardless of whether it has misrepresented any
aspect of the transaction. The court imposed this duty because it determined
that the bank was a fiduciary. When Stone is viewed from this perspective, it
is a significant departure from tradition.
B. Washington-The Banker as Quasi-Fiduciary
In Hutson v. Wenatchee Federal Savings and Loan Association 108 the
105. Walters, 69 Ohio St. 2d at 679, 433 N.E. 2d at 610.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 680, 433 N.E.2d at 610.
108. 22 Wash. App. 91, 588 P.2d 1192 (1978).
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Washington Court of Appeals also faced a case involving a savings and loan
association selling credit insurance to a married couple. The court in Hutson
was unwilling to find that the lender acted in a fiduciary capacity, but did hold
the institution to the disclosure obligations of a quasi-fiduciary.10 9 Larry and
Joyce Hutson went to the bank to obtain a home improvement loan. The
lender's officer suggested it would be easier to finance construction of a new
home, and the Hutsons followed his advice. Mrs. Hutson alleged that, pursu-
ant to taking out a loan from the savings and loan association, she specifically
asked for credit life insurance and the bank's employee "impliedly agreed" 110
to purchase it. In addition, Hutson claimed she relied on the loan application,
prepared by the lender, which provided that $39.22 was to be paid each month
for "taxes, fire insurance, assessments, and ife insurance.""' The bank never
bought credit life insurance. Instead it obtained "mortgage insurance." Credit
life insurance would have paid off the mortgage when Mr. Hutson died one
year after the loan was obtained. Mortgage insurance, as that term is used by
savings and loan associations, insures the bank, not the borrower. If the bor-
rower defaults, the insurer pays the lender and assumes the burden of foreclos-
ing on the debt. 1 2 Hutson claimed that the term "mortgage insurance" had a
specialized meaning in the savings and loan industry, the lender had a duty to
define that term for her, and it was negligent in failing to do so. The trial court
instructed the jury that the lender had no duty to define the term and did not
allow Hutson to present evidence that the term has a meaning in the commer-
cial banking industry that is different from its meaning in the savings and loan
industry.
The court of appeals found that the lender did not fit within the tradi-
tional definition of a fiduciary since "it profits from the business transac-
tion."11 3 This is similar to the determination in Umbaugh that the lender
could not be a fiduciary because it was not acting solely or primarily in the
borrower's interests. In addition, both the Umbaugh and Hutson courts found
that whether the parties dealt at arm's length was crucial. While the Umbaugh
court found the lender's provision of advice and counseling did not affect the
arm's length nature of the parties' negotiating postures, the Hutson court
pointed to several factors that significantly shortened the arm's length distance
between the parties. The court examined both general banking practices and
the actions of the lender. The court noted that lenders dealing with "individ-
ual customers like plaintiff. . . often give financial advice about how much
debt a person with any given income will be able to carry. Lenders also may
explain the legal requirements applicable to any particular loan to the bor-
109. Courts have found quasi-fiduciary relationships to exist in several other contexts. See,
e.g., In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 1348, 1350 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (carrier's duty to
shipper); Johnston v. Livingston Nursing Home, Inc., 282 Ala. 309,314,211 So. 2d 151, 156 (1968)
(duty of corporate directors to corporation and its stockholders); Gross v. J & L Camping & Sports
Center, Inc., 270 Md. 539, 546, 312 A.2d 270, 275 (1973) (real estate broker's duty to lessor).
110. Hutson, 22 Wash. App. at 93, 58 P.2d at 1194.
111. Id. at 94, 588 P.2d at 1194.
112. Id. at 92, 588 P.2d at 1193.
113. Id. at 102, 588 P.2d at 1198.
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rower."114 In addition, federally mandated Truth in Lending disclosures
change the relationship between the parties because "they remove certain fac-
tors from the bargaining area, limiting the amount of leeway the lender has in
dealing with its customer." ' 1 5 In regard to credit life insurance, the defendant
and many other lenders "routinely provide the service of arranging credit life
insurance."
1 16
Moreover, the court pointed to specific actions taken by the defendant
that showed this was not an arm's length business transaction. The lender
took the initiative of providing financial advice about a federally subsidized
loan program. The court admitted that this is a "complex relationship" since
the lender both advises the borrower and screens applicants for the govern-
ment. Therefore, the lender does not act solely or primarily for the benefit of
the borrower as Umbaugh required. But the court went on to recount Hut-
son's allegation that she relied on the lender's advice to build a new house
rather than remodel her present one, and on his assurance that the loan was
financially feasible for her. Finally, the court described the specific steps taken
by the lender to promote its sale of credit life insurance. "This extra service,
while not changing the relationship to one of fiduciary trust, does mean that
the customer will rely upon the lender for one more facet of the entire
transaction."' 
17
The court examined the entire pattern of the lender's conduct in regard to
this transaction, and held that the savings and loan association occupied a
position of trust and confidence and was in a quasi-fiduciary relationship with
the borrower.
Both the Hutson and Stone courts wrenched the bank from its traditional
protected role of lender and threw it into the treacherous role of fiduciary and
quasi-fiduciary. The approach of each court, however, was significantly differ-
ent. The Stone court implicitly rejected the test that a fiduciary is one who the
customer reasonably expects is acting solely or primarily in the customer's be-
half. Quite to the contary, Stone referred to the bank's self-interest to support
either its finding of a fiduciary relationship or its imposition of liability. In
contrast, Hutson refused to find a fiduciary relationship because the customer
knew the bank was motivated by its interest in making a profit from the trans-
action. Stone assumed without any examination of the facts that the parties
dealt at arm's length until they entered the loan processing stage of the trans-
action and the issue of credit insurance arose. Hutson did not limit itself to
that stage. Rather it looked at the "entire pattern," including financial advice
that was not directly related to credit insurance.
Having found the lender was acting in a quasi-fiduciary capacity, the Hut-
son court imposed upon it a duty of disclosure more exacting than if the court
had found the bank to be a mere lender. That duty, however, did not neces-
114. Id.
115. Id. at 102, 588 P.2d at 1199.
116. Id. at 103, 588 P.2d at 1199.
117. Id.
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sarily require the bank to define the term mortgage insurance. Rather, "it was
a jury question whether the lender had a duty to define any ambiguous or
specialized terms which might mislead unknowledgeable and uncounseled
customers, members of the lay public who rely on the lender's advice." 1 8
Consequently, the bank customer must prove "mortgage insurance" is an am-
biguous or specialized term, and must prove he or she was an unknowledge-
able and uncounseled person who relied upon the bank's advice. If the
customer met her burden of proof on these facts, the bank had a duty to define
the term if it knew or should have known that failure to define the term might
mislead this customer.
Just as the Walters court could have imposed liability on the bank with-
out conferring on the bank the status of a fiduciary, so too the Hutson court
need not have found the lender was a quasi-fiduciary. The court stated that
section 551(2)(b) of the Restatement of Torts would also apply to the Hutson
transaction.19 That section imposes upon a party to a business transaction a
duty to disclose information "necessary to prevent his partial or ambiguous
statement of the facts from being misleading."' 20 The court found that a jury
could decide the lender's "mentioning mortgage insurance without defining it
as such a 'partial or ambiguous statement' that it might mislead a reasonable
customer." 121
The Restatement section upon which the court relied does not require a
finding that the party making the partial or ambiguous statement be in a
quasi-fiduciary relationship with the party to whom the statement is made.
This is indicated both by the failure of the section to refer to the status of any
of the parties to the business transaction, and the contrast between this provi-
sion and an accompanying section that bases disclosure explicitly upon the
status of the person making the statement and the relationship of the
parties.'
22
118. Id. at 105, 588 P.2d at 1200.
119. Id. at 103, 588 P.2d at 1199.
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(b) (1957).
121. Hutson, 22 Wash. App. at 103, 588 P.2d at 1199.
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1957) imposes a duty to disclose "mat-
ters ... that the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust
and confidence" between the parties. Id. Although the court quoted this section, 22 Wash. App.
at 101, 588 P.2d at 1198, it did not base the decision upon it. Id. at 103, 588 P.2d at 1199. The
court may have read the section to require a finding that the lender was acting in a fiduciary
capacity or another equivalent capacity. Since the court was willing to hold that the lender acted
in a quasi-fiduciary capacity, it may have found the section inapplicable. In the course of its
decision, however, the Hutson court cites with approval a case in which the Washington Supreme
Court found two parties in a quasi-fiduciary relationship. In that case the court applied section
551(2)(a), the Restatement disclosure rule applicable to fiduciaries. See Boonstra v. Stevens-Nor-
ton, Inc., 64 Wash. 2d 621, 625, 393 P.2d 287, 290 (1964). In addition to holding that the section
governs cases involving quasi-fiduciaries, the court in Boonstra implied that the rule was not lim-
ited to fiduciaries, or those in a comparable status, by deleting from its quote of the Restatement
section the word "fiduciary," including only the requirement that the parties be in "a relation of
trust and confidence." Id at 625, 393 P.2d at 290.
In Hutson the court avoided interpreting section 551(2)(a) in light of Boonstra by basing its
alternative holding on section 551(2)(b), which makes no mention of the relationship between the
parties.
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Financial institutions in Washington might try to limit Hutson to its facts
or to cases involving partial or ambiguous statements, arguing that courts
should avoid following Hutson's approach of classifying the lender as a quasi-
fiduciary since the quasi-fiduciary part of the opinion was not necessary in
light of Hutson's reliance on tort law as well. Banks might be tempted to do
so, fearing that courts might apply the quasi-fiduciary classification to addi-
tional bank conduct, thereby imposing duties of disclosure in many more situ-
ations. Washington banks still risk being held to quasi-fiduciary duties even if
subsequent decisions ignore or distinguish the Hutson case. These institutions
are still bound by a ruling of the state's highest court that found a quasi-fiduci-
ary relationship exists and a duty to disclose follows when one party has supe-
rior business knowledge and experience and knows the other party is relying
on its judgment.' 23 Moreover, the Restatement rule on ambiguous statements
contains its own potential for expanded application since it applies to all bank-
customer transactions, regardless of whether the bank is in a quasi-fiduciary
role.
Banks in Washington face the possibility of attacks on three fronts. First,
under Hutson they may have a duty to define ambiguous terms when they
engage in the type of conduct that results in a quasi-fiduciary relationship.
Second, courts may apply a Restatement rule that imposes a more general
duty to disclose on banks found to be quasi-fiduciaries because of their rela-
tion of trust and confidence with the customers.124 Finally, the duty to define
the terms may arise from the Restatement rule on explanation of ambiguous
statements.1 25 This duty does not depend on a quasi-fiduciary relationship.
C The Failure of the Trust and Confidence 4pproach
Although the trust and confidence doctrine may provide a sound basis for
decisions in other banking contexts, 126 analysis of credit life insurance cases
123. Boonstra v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 64 Wash. 2d 621, 625, 393 P.2d 287, 289 (1964).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1957).
125. Id. § 551(2)(b).
126. Although courts have been unable to apply successfully the trust and confidence ap-
proach in credit life insurance cases, there may be other types of banking transactions to which
this theory would apply without the difficulties encountered in credit insurance cases. Banks in-
creasingly are offering comprehensive financial planning services to their customers. See FullMa-
jority ofBanks Offer Financial Planning, Am. Banker, June 7, 1983, at 6, col. 3. In some cases
banks will establish relations with their customers in which trust and confidence is reposed. In
addition, some advertising by financial institutions may give customers the impression that the
bank wants trust and confidence to be reposed in them. Implicit is the message that the institution
accepts the obligation to act primarily in the customer's best interest. For example, an advertise-
ment for the Sears Financial Network states in part:
When people put their trust in the Sears Financial Network, they're anything but speech-
less .... "I think people trust the Sears Financial Network because they know Sears."
Because people--even people who make a good living-need good, sound advice
about their money. And they need that advice simple to understand and easy to
find.... And perhaps most of all, they need it from people they trust.
The Atlanta Constitution, Sept. 29, 1982, at 9-D.
A commerical bank advertisement stresses the expertise of its loan officers and its interest in
obtaining the best loan for the customer, implying that the customer's best interest is the primary
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lends support to the criticisms of this approach.127 Courts have developed
new and uncertain standards for determining when a person will be regarded
as a fiduciary. This puts banks at an unfair disadvantage. They need certain
and general rules that can be applied easily to distinct types of transactions in
order for them to conduct efficient operations. Whether the bank is a fiduciary
under the trust and confidence doctrine depends on facts that will vary from
one sale of credit life insurance to the next. In some transactions the parties
will not deal at arm's length, the bank will possess superior bargaining power
and experience, and both parties will realize the customer is reposing trust and
confidence. In other transactions the opposite will be true; and in still others it
will be difficult to determine the exact nature of the relationship. This is un-
satisfactory. Both the customer and the bank need to know the legal relation-
ship between the parties in every typical sale of credit life insurance. The
courts in Stone and Walters tried to overcome this problem by finding as a
matter of law that certain facts were present, whether the evidence indicated
they actually were. This artificial approach does violence to traditional fiduci-
ary concepts.
Whether a bank is a quasi-fiduciary under the Hutson test also depends
on the facts of each case. These facts may be difficult for the banker to deter-
mine. For example, is a term ambiguous or specialized? Is the borrower unin-
formed? Should the bank know that failure to define a term may mislead the
customer? In addition, the court does not develop standards that could be
applied in a credit insurance case involving a different type of dispute.
What is needed is an approach that is consistent with the realities of the
situation, in which a neutral legal concept can be applied without undue
strain, to clearly guide banks.
V. THE BANK AS AGENT OF THE INSURED
Insurance case law that examines the legal relationship between the cus-
tomer and the person in the position to procure insurance provides a neutral
conceptual basis for analyzing the sale of credit life insurance by banks. It is
surprising that the decisions reviewed thus far have not referred to that case
consideration. "Our Personal Loan Specialists will work hard to find the loan that's just right for
you." Id., May 13, 1983, at 2-D, col. 2.
One savings and loan stresses in advertisement after advertisement that the institution is the
customer's "partner." "So come and open any kind of account at Decatur Federal. By doing so,
you'll have us as a Partner, vitally interested in your financial well being. ... The advertise-
ment closes with: "[ylour partner Decatur Federal." Id, June 29, 1983, at 13-A, col. 4; July 13,
1983, 1 I-A, col. 3. See also id, Aug. 19, 1983, at 13-A, col. 3.
Manufacturers Hanover advertised:
What business demands now is reliable credit alternatives intertwined with informa-
tional and operation services - giving access not just to a bank but to a total financial
source. . . . [O]ur customers characterize Manufacturers Hanover as second to none for
flexibility, accuracy and loyalty... . We don't take a "lend you and leave you" attitude
toward our customers.
Advertising supplement, Am. Banker, April 16, 1979, quoted in Symons, The Bank-Customer
Relation. Part lI-The Judicial Decisions, 100 BANKING L.J. 325, 327 (1983) (emphasis added).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 24-33.
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law. The sale is essentially an insurance transaction even though the bank's
primary role is that of a lender. Insurance law provides us with a well devel-
oped body of legal rules that do not share the deficiencies of the approaches
discussed above. Banks can apply these rules to determine whether they will
be considered fiduciaries. If they do not wish to assume the responsibilities
that status entails, they can take steps to prevent courts from designating them
fiduciaries.
Those procuring insurance are held to occupy fiduciary status when they
act as the customer's agent. A brief summary of agency law will set the stage
for an examination of this issue. The legal relationship of agency arises when
there is an agreement between two parties that one will act on behalf of an-
other and will be subject to the other's control in regard to the specific under-
taking. 128 To determine whether this relationship exists, one looks only at
whether certain facts are present. It does not matter whether the parties in-
tended to establish an agency relationship or whether they intended the legal
consequences that such a relationship entails.129 There need not be a contract
between the parties. 130 The relationship exists "when the parties behaved in
such a way that the rules" of agency "come into operation."131 This behavior
consists of the principal consenting that the agent may act for him and the
agent accepting the undertaking. It is not necessary for either of the parties to
expressly manifest his consent. The required consent will be found if it can be
"reasonably inferred from the conduct of the parties."'132 The agent does not
have to iqdicate his consent in any explicit manner. In some situations, if a
person performs the undertaking to which the principal consented, that con-
duct is in itself "a sufficient indication of consent."133 A person can be an
agent even though he has an interest adverse to the principal. 134 Moreover, an
agency relationship is not precluded if the agent acts on behalf of one person
for part of the transaction and on behalf of another for the rest of the transac-
tion. The agent has two principals and has duties to each, depending on which
aspect of the transaction is involved.135 It is not inconsistent with agency con-
cepts for the agent to obtain a commission from the person with whom he is
doing business on behalf of the customer-principal. As long as it is normal
commercial practice for persons in the agent's position to receive a fee, such a
payment is permitted since the principal was, or should have been, aware that
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 comment (1)(a) (1954).
129. Id. comment (1)(b).
130. See Seavey, supra note 38, at 863. Agency is "analogous to a trust rather than to a con-
tract and the mutual obligations are created by the fiduciary character of the relationship." Id
131. H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNER-
SHIP 10 (1979).
132. W. SELL, SELL ON AGENCY 1 (1975). See, e.g., In re Schmidt, 210 F. Supp. 106, 113 (E.D.
Wise. 1962).
133. W. SELL, supra note 132, at 14.
134. Seavey, supra note 38, at 869-70. Contrast this adverse interest rule with the trust and
confidence rule requiring that the person who has reposed trust and confidence must have reason-
ably expected the other party to act primarily on his behalf. See supra text accompanying notes 85
and 99.




Applying these rules in cases involving types of insurance other than
credit life, courts have found insurance agents to be agents of the insured when
they procure or are requested to procure insurance.137 Several features pres-
ent in the sale of credit life insurance indicates that banks should be consid-
ered the borrower's agent in this type of transaction as well.
In the sale of credit life insurance the customer normally engages in con-
duct from which one can reasonably infer that he consents that the bank act as
his agent for the purpose of obtaining insurance. This occurs when the con-
sumer signs the Truth in Lending statement in which he agrees that he desires
insurance. His consent may also be manifested by conversations about the
insurance between the consumer and the bank officer. The bank may agree to
be an agent in a number of ways. The bank officer may expressly agree to
purchase the insurance or he may have the consumer complete an application,
thus "embarking on the purpose of the agency."138 Presenting the customer
with the Truth in Lending disclosure statement indicates the bank's consent to
be an agent for the purpose of purchasing credit insurance, unless the bank
also engages in conduct that clearly indicates to the consumer that the bank
will not act as his agent.
While the bank may be the borrower's agent with respect to procuring
credit insurance, it is also considered an agent for the insurer when engaging
in other activities such as collecting premiums. This creates no legal difficul-
ties. Agency law has long recognized that a person can be a dual agent.
139
This is an exception to the traditional agency rule that an agent must have
undivided loyalty to his principal. The strict formulation of this exception is
that the party can be both agent to the insured and the insurer when this is
done with the express or implied consent of both parties and their interests do
not conflict. In most insurance cases, however, courts find a proper dual
agency even when it is not clear both parties consented to the dual agency and
when "there would appear to be an inherent conflict of interest"' 40 in the dual
relationship.
The foregoing discussion indicates the sale of credit insurance fits neatly
into the traditional law of agency as it has been applied, and somewhat modi-
fied, in insurance cases. This has significant implications for banks because an
agent is in a fiduciary relationship with his principal. 141 Nevertheless, it is not
advisable to regard the characterization of a legal relationship as conclusive.
That is, even if an examination of the credit life insurance transaction leads
136. P. FINN, supra note 21, at 212.
137. Eg., Black v. Illinois Fair Plan Ass'n, 409 N.E.2d 549 (III. App. Ct. 1980); Hlavaty v.
Kribs Ford, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 328 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); see generally, G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF
INSURANCE LAW § 25:101 (2d ed. 1960).
138. W. SELL, supra note 123, at 8.
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14L (1954); G. COUCH, supra note 137, at
§ 25:101.
140. Rokes, DualAgency of Insurance Agents and Brokers, 44 INS. COUNS. J. 677, 681 (1977).
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1954).
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ineluctably to the conclusion that the bank is the customer's fiduciary because
of the agency relationship, courts could justifiably resist the implications of
such a finding if it led to bad policy, such as giving the borrower an unde-
served advantage, or imposing too great a burden upon the bank. 142 In this
connection it is appropriate to note the policy of the Federal Reserve Board.
The Board has "expressed the expectation" that when a bank holding com-
pany or its subsidiary sells credit insurance in a transaction subject to the
Board's regulations, it "will exercise a fiduciary responsibility."' 14 3 In addi-
tion, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has sug-
gested that banks be required to meet fiduciary standards in the sale of credit
insurance. 144 A NAIC staff study noted the double standard that presently
exists. 145 When bank management purchases corporate insurance to cover
bank property, it seeks the best possible terms. That is, it purchases insurance
from a company that is financially stable and provides adequate service at a
reasonable cost. To buy insurance on other terms would be a breach of man-
agement's fiduciary duty to its stockholders. In stark contrast, when purchas-
ing credit insurance for its customers, banks generally buy the most expensive
insurance because to do so results in the greatest profit for the bank.
The pronouncements of these institutions intimately involved in the credit
insurance industry suggest that regarding banks as fiduciaries is not bad pol-
icy. A sounder judgment can be made, however, if we also examine the obli-
gations that fiduciary status entails.
An agent is a fiduciary with specific duties. These duties are "inferred"
from his position as an agent.1 46 One duty is the use of care and skill.' 47
When a person takes on the role of an agent, he must act with "skill commen-
surate with the job to be done" and must "use that skill with diligence."' 148 In
addition, the agent must "use reasonable effort" to provide his principal infor-
mation that the principal "would desire to have."' 149 This duty refers both to
information in regard to the transaction itself, and information about the rela-
142. Fiduciary obligations are imposed upon individuals who engage in activities that require
legal regulation. "It is not because a person is a 'fiduciary' . that a rule applies to him. It is
because a particular rule applies to him that he is a fiduciary. . .for is purposes. " P. FINN, supra
note 21, at 2 (emphasis in original).
143. 36 Fed. Reg. 15,526 (1971).
144. Letter from Richards D. Barger, President, National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners to Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (April 5, 1972) (available in the
office of the North Carolina Law Review). See also Letter from Robert E. Dineen, consultant to
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, to Baldwin Tuttle, Board of Governors,
Federal Reserve System (October 6, 1972) (recommending implementation of fiduciary standards)
(available in the office of the North Carolina Law Review); Letter from Russell E, Van Hooser,
Commissioner of Insurance, State of Michigan, to Arthur Burns, Chairman, Federal Reserve
Board (April 14, 1971) (recommending imposition of fiduciary responsibility) (available in the
office of the North Carolina Law Review).
145. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, A BACKGROUND STUDY OF
THE REGULATION OF CREDIT LIFE AND DISABILITY INSURANCE 132-33 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as NAIC STUDY].
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 comment a (1954).
147. Id. at § 379.
148. H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 131, at 121.
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1954).
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tionship between the agent and others involved in the transaction.15 0 For ex-
ample, if the agent has interests adverse to the principal, or represents another
party with adverse interests, he has a duty to disclose those facts to the princi-
pal.' 5 The agent has a duty to obey the principal by following his instruc-
tionsI5 2 and also owes him a duty of loyalty.1
53
In cases involving other types of insurance, courts have not hesitated to
impose fiduciary duties upon agents of the insured who failed to procure the
type of insurance coverage they were instructed to purchase.' 54 Agents have
been held liable even though the insured (the principal) was seemingly vulner-
able to the defense of estoppel on a contract theory or contributory negligence
on a tort theory because the insured failed to read the policy and discover the
error or omission.1 55 These potential defenses are to no avail because the
principal is entitled to rely on the agent's use of care and skill. "Business
could not be carried on" if the principal had a duty to use his own care and
skill to make sure his agent employed the proper amount of care and skill in
the performance of his duties.'
56
The cases reviewed in this Article illustrate many of the problems con-
sumers confront when credit insurance is involved and raise questions about
the exact nature of the bank's duties in these transactions. Applying agency
status to the bank, with the duties which accompany that status, provides far
clearer guidelines than those available to the courts if other standards are
used. The duty to provide information that the principal "would desire to
have" requires the bank to explain the mechanics of purchasing insurance and
to explain ambiguous terms, or terms, such as "mortgage insurance," that have
a specialized meaning. This duty to disclose apparently would be a stricter
requirement than the duty imposed in Hutson, which requires that a bank
define terms only if-the consumer could show that those terms might mislead
him. The bank also would be required to disclose that it has adverse interests
to the extent that it profits from the sale of credit insurance. The duties to
follow the principal's instructions and to use skill and care would be violated if
the bank failed to procure insurance and it appeared from all the circum-
stances that the customer expected it to do so.
As an agent with fiduciary responsibilities, the bank also may be required
to advise the client whether it is wise to purchase credit insurance from the
bank at all. As explained above, although it is a sensible purchase for some
consumers, for most it is unnecessary and too expensive to be a good value.
The duty to provide this counseling arises from the agent's duties to be loyal,
150. Id. at § 381 comment a.
151. Id. at § 381 comment d.
152. Id. at § 385.
153. Id. at § 387.
154. See generally Rokes, supra note 140. In other cases the courts have imposed on insurance
agents a stringent standard of commercial practice without referring to fiduciary obligations. See,
e.g., Hardt v. Brink, 192 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Wash. 1961).
155. Eg., Hampton Roads Carriers v. Boston Ins. Co., 150 F. Supp. 338 (D. Md. 1957).
156. Id. at 344 (quoting J. ARNOULD, MARINE INSURANCE 160 (13th ed. 1950)).
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to provide information the principal "would desire to have," and to use skill
and care.
One court has expressed support for this view. In Browder v. Hanley Daw-
son Cadillac 157 the consumer's complaint alleged that the car dealer who sold
him credit insurance was a fiduciary, and as such had the duty to inform him
that cheaper but comparable insurance was available. The court remanded the
case for a determination about whether the car dealer acted as an agent of the
consumer. The court went on to say that if the dealer were an agent, he had a
fiduciary responsibility to disclose all material facts that might affect the trans-
action, including all the facts about the price and the credit insurance.158 Ap-
parently, if the consumer could show the existence of an agency relationship,
the car dealer would be required to explain that less expensive insurance was
available.
In a comparable vein, the court in In re Dickson 159 found that a financial
institution violated its fiduciary duty when it charged about twice as much for
credit insurance as considered "adequate" by the state insurance commis-
sioner, received a 25% rebate as a commission, and failed to disclose these
facts to the consumer. The court also found that the failure to disclose consti-
tuted an unfair and deceptive practice under the North Carolina statute
prohibiting such practices. 160 The Browder court agreed with this analysis,
asserting that if the trial court found the creditor was an agent, he violated the
Illinois Consumer Fraud statute by failing to disclose the availability of
cheaper insurance.161
These cases are consistent with a Federal Reserve policy statement which
said that the Federal Reserve expected a financial institution, in the exercise of
its fiduciary responsibilities in the sale of credit insurance, to make "its best
effort to obtain the insurance at the lowest practicable cost to the customer."
162
It is likely that banks would object to a general duty to provide counseling
or a specific duty to provide detailed price disclosures and comparisons. These
duties conflict with the bank's interest in making the highest profit on the sale
of credit insurance, and thrust the bank officer into the role of adviser and
financial counselor. Imposing that responsibility can be justified, however, by
the nature of the transaction and the conduct of the bank. As described above,
many consumers believe credit life insurance is required, others believe it pro-
vides protection otherwise not available. Because of its low monthly cost, con-
sumers do not realize its real cost and do not engage in comparative shopping.
157. 62 Ill. App. 3d 623,379 N.E.2d 1206 (1978); accord Fox v. Industrial Casualty Ins. Co., 98
Ill. App. 3d 543, 424 N.E.2d 839 (1981).
158. Browder, 62 Ill. App. 3d at 630, 379 N.E.2d at 1211.
159. 432 F. Supp. 752 (W.D.N.C. 1977) (mem.).
160. Id. at 761.
161. 62 Ill. App. 3d at 631, 379 N.E.2d at 1212. Other cases holding that sale of credit insur-
ance falls within the scope of state unfair and deceptive acts or practices statutes include Fox v.
Industrial Casualty Ins. Co., 98 Ill. App. 3d 543, 424 N.E.2d 839 (1981); Dodd v. Commercial
Union Ins, Co., 373 Mass. 72, 365 N.E.2d 802 (1977); Ranger County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Guinn, 608
S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
162. 36 Fed. Reg. 15,526 (1971).
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Therefore, the bank is the only place where credit insurance is sold. As one
court has pointed out:
The critical fact is that the lending officer, by virtue of his ability to
communicate with the borrower, is the only person anywhere who
has a real opportunity to explain the benefits of credit life to a bor-
rower and obtain assent to such insurance. The lending institution is
uniquely situated for placement of credit life.
163
The bank is not required to purchase credit insurance. It voluntarily
takes on the role of seller of insurance and profits from doing so both moneta-
rily and in increased security for the loan. Once the bank holds itself out to
the public as a seller of insurance, it is not unreasonable to impose on it fair
standards of business practice. What is fair depends on the nature of the
transaction. The cost, function, and need for credit insurance are not well
understood by the consumer. It is incidental to the loan and it is purchased or
intended to be purchased as one small part of a complex transaction filled with
technicalities. The transaction is characterized by reverse competition since
the bank has a strong motivation to sell the most expensive insurance. The
remarkably high penetration rates vividly illustrate the effect of the above fea-
tures of the transaction: almost every consumer buys the insurance whether he
needs it or not. Under these circumstances, it is not unreasonable to impose a
duty on the bank to provide some form of financial counseling on the cost and
need for the insurance.
It is not certain how the banks might react to imposition of this duty. It
would increase the bank's costs. The bank would have to train its loan officers
to provide meaningful information about credit insurance. Loan officers
would have to spend more time with customers to complete the loan transac-
tion. These extra costs might be passed on to customers rather than be taken
out of the bank's profits from the sale of the insurance. Providing increased
information to consumers about credit insurance may result in information
overload in light of all the other disclosures provided the consumer. Most
troubling, banks may fear that providing counseling on the purchase of credit
insurance could lead to greater risks. Consumers might complain that the in-
formation provided was incomplete or misleading. As a result of these poten-
tial costs and problems, banks might stop offering credit insurance. As noted
above, this would not harm most consumers since they do not need it anyway.
Presumably the free market will operate to provide it through non-banking
sources for those who do need it. If banks want the loan covered by insurance
for the extra security it provides the bank, they can purchase the insurance
themselves and not impose an insurance charge on the consumer. A duty to
counsel should not result in such a case.
If the consumer decides to purchase credit insurance after receiving ad-
vice and counseling from the bank, the bank would be obligated to provide the
insurance at a charge reasonable for a fiduciary. Although such a duty would
require banks to drastically alter their practices, this requirement already has
163. First Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 436 F. Supp. 824, 830 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
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been recommended by the Federal Reserve Board 164 and the National Associ-
ation of Insurance Commissioners.165 NAIC has suggested banks could fulfill
their responsibilities by obtaining competitive bids or demonstrating "a rea-
sonable affrmative effort to obtain a fair sampling of the market."' 166 If the
bank can show it accepted the lowest bid (consistent with reasonable require-
ments regarding service and financial stability), it could successfully fend off
customer claims of a breach of the duty to obtain credit insurance at a price
consistent with the responsibilities of a fiduciary. The bank would be permit-
ted to charge an amount for rendering the service of purchasing the insurance,
but this would be limited to an amount appropriate for a fiduciary to receive.
Requiring the bank to solicit bids should not be regarded as an unreasonable
burden, for, as NAIC has pointed out, this is a standard practice for employers
who obtain credit insurance for their employees. NAIC found that the result-
ing aggressive competition among insurance companies has resulted in lower
prices and smaller profit margins, but the continued eagerness of insurance
companies to offer group insurance to employees indicates the profit margin is
adequate.
While the agency-fiduciary approach imposes significant burdens upon
banks, it should also result in a substantial benefit. Imposing the duties of an
agent probably will result in the establishment of a competitive market for the
sale of credit life insurance.1 67 The resulting lower premiums should lessen
the pressure for government regulation to lower rates to a level comparable to
that in other segments of the industry. Thus, application of agency law serves
business' general objective of increasing government deregulation.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE BANK AS FIDUCIARY; THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
CONCEPTUAL BASIS
The analysis and discussion presented in this Article illustrate the extent
to which case law concerning the sale of credit life insurance has developed in
a piecemeal and isolated manner. Each court appears unaware of decisions
rendered by other courts. Each opinion fails properly to place itself within the
general context of fiduciary law. As a result, the case law has not produced an
adequate analytical framework for determining the liability of banks. The in-
adequacy of this body of law invites regulatory intervention to prevent abuse.
The need for regulation, however, could be obviated by faithfully adhering to
traditional concepts of fiduciary law.
The three lines of cases examined in this Article have placed banks in a
fiduciary relationship to the borrower. If there is a contractual relationship
between the parties the bank is a fiduciary when the customer entrusts it with
the premium. If the customer reposes trust and confidence, the bank may be a
fiduciary. Finally, if the bank is the customer's agent, fiduciary duties result.
164. 36 Fed. Reg. 15,526 (1971).
165. Letter from Richards D. Barger, supra note 144.
166. Id.
167. NAIC Study, supra note 145, at 135.
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Although banks were labeled fiduciaries in each instance, the Article shows
the substantial differences that exist depending upon the conceptual basis on
which the fiduciary status is based.
The entrusting approach imposes a heavy responsibility upon the bank to
engage in affirmative conduct to make certain the customer is insured. This
obligation is triggered only if there was a legally enforceable agreement to
purchase credit life insurance. The cases illustrate the difficulties the con-
sumer may have in establishing such an agreement. Even if a contractual rela-
tionship existed, no fiduciary duties arise unless the customer paid for the
insurance. Finally, fiduciary responsibilities arise only in regard to the duty to
procure insurance. Other aspects of the sale of insurance are not covered.
The trust and confidence approach is the most problematic. Courts ap-
plying it to the sale of credit insurance have violated traditional fiduciary stan-
dards. In addition, if customers are required to show that they reposed trust
and confidence in the bank, they will face substantial problems of proof. Per-
haps for that reason, courts that favor this approach assume the necessary facts
are present, absent proof to the contrary. In any given transaction, however, it
may not be clear to the banks that trust and confidence were reposed. Conse-
quently, banks may find fiduciary duties imposed in transactions in which they
reasonably do not expect them. Because of these features, it is unlikely many
courts will adopt this method of addressing credit insurance transactions.
The agency approach is the most appropriate. It is consistent with gen-
eral insurance law. Agency law is based on the objective conduct of the par-
ties, not subjective factors such as trust and confidence. Consequently, banks
can look at their standard business practices and apply established principles
from insurance cases in determining whether an agency relationship exists.
Banks can ascertain what fiduciary duties they are responsible for by examin-
ing traditional agency law. Similarly, courts that are called upon to decide
disputes can look at these sources for guidance. As a result, decisions should
be relatively consistent and predictable. Additional regulation of these trans-
actions should be unnecessary.
There are drawbacks to this approach. Whether an agency relationship
exists is a question of fact, not law. Therefore, there is the potential for a
disagreement in every transaction. The only alternatives, however, are for
courts to rely upon one of the far more unsatisfactory approaches discussed
above, develop a new body of law for these transactions, or hold that an
agency relationship always exists as a matter of law when credit insurance is in
any way involved. The latter mode of analysis conflicts with standard agency
law. It is also too restrictive. In some instances, a bank may make it very clear
that it is not acting as the customer's agent. The bank should have that option.
If the bank does not exercise that option, it should be held to the responsibili-
ties of other agents in light of the context in which the sale of credit life insur-
ance takes place.
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